

NEW BOOKS

personality in its movement towards ultimate value; and also to Scheler, who emphasizes the independence and creativeness of personality. One great merit of Kierkegaard and Berdyaeff is that both of them have lived their philosophy. The depth of personal convictions in both these writers is most impressive. Martin Buber's little book, *I and Thou*, should be better known than it is. Man, he says, forms two relationships, that with the world of objects, which he indicates by the combination *I-It*, and the relationship of *I-Thou*, with nature, with persons, and with God. Reality and meaning belong only to the second type. There are three pathways to reality, by art, by love, and by mystical experience. But the life of Spirit is always one of relations, and of relation not to a world of objects, an *It*, but to a single object. False mysticism, by obliterating the distinction between subject and object, makes love impossible. Buber emphasizes the true freedom and spontaneity of the spiritual life.

We must distinguish between the individual and the person. Individuals are monads shut up within themselves, *solida pollutia simplicitate* as Lucretius says. Personality, though its centre is never lost, may expand till all experience is within its circumference. "In *I-Thou* relationships, in the world of pure effective action, man escapes from causality." In all real prayer, as in all love, the *I-Thou* relationship is never transcended. Prayer is never a soliloquy nor a spiritual dumbbell exercise.

Personalism then believes that we are not fully personal to begin with. There must be a change, a growth, a transformation of *psyche* into *pneuma*, of soul into spirit. This, it need not be said, is no new doctrine. The Platonic *Nous*, the Indian *Atman*, are the universal self which the individual may win without losing his identity. It is really the central doctrine of St. Paul, of whom the author once quotes without disapproval a superficial and disparaging estimate. It is the only blot in the book. The soul is an Amphibium, having relations both with a higher and with a lower level than its own. In order to become "spiritual" I must die to the lower self. What asceticism there is in St. Paul is part of the severe struggle to get free from "the old man" with his deceitful lusts. What distinguishes St. Paul's psychology from the similar schemes which have been mentioned is the emphasis on love as the fulfilling of the law, and the fine words that "love is the energy of faith." St. Paul doubtless remembered the words of Christ that only he who is willing to lose his *psyche* can keep it unto life eternal.

The book ends with a declaration of faith in theism. "It seems to me indisputable that this experience of God can re-energize human souls, can make possible a degree of personal integration and detachment from self-regarding impulses otherwise unattainable, and can lead to that capacity for heroism, that cheerful acceptance of tragedy, that willingness to take on oneself the sufferings of others, that is the basis of the highest human virtues and achievements."

W. R. INGE.

The Moral Law, or Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. By H. J. PATON. (Hutchinson's University Library. Pp. v + 151.)

This book is a new translation by Professor Paton of Kant's *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*. The translation is preceded by an analysis of the argument, which occupies forty pages, and it is followed by eleven pages of explanatory notes.

So far as I am aware the only English translation hitherto available has been that of Dr. T. K. Abbott of Trinity College, Dublin. This is not published separately, but is the first item in a set of translations of all Kant's main

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ethical works, issued in one volume by Messrs. Longman under the title of *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and other Works on the Theory of Ethics*. Most of us were brought up on this book, but I do not know whether it is still in print.

I do not think that Professor Paton's book will supersede Abbott's, because anyone making a serious study of Kant's ethics will need the other works and will find it handy to have them all together. But even such students will find Professor Paton's translation a valuable supplement to Abbott's book, and they might be well advised to substitute it for Abbott's translation of the *Grundlegung*. Undergraduates beginning the study of Kant's ethics will find Professor Paton's excellent analysis a most valuable first-aid in struggling with a rather difficult and very important philosophical classic. For a critical account and a sympathetic defence of Kant's ethical doctrines by the greatest living English Kantian scholar they may be referred to Professor Paton's companion volume *The Categorical Imperative*.

In his preface Professor Paton stresses the absolutely fundamental importance of this work of Kant's to anyone who proposes to philosophize about morality. I agree with this judgment. If Kant was mistaken, his mistakes are generally more enlightening and original than other men's correctitudes. It is important that Kant's work in ethics should be available in a good and easily obtainable translation, not only for its intrinsic importance, but also because it has been peculiarly exposed to unfair criticisms based on ignorance or misrepresentation of what he said. A recent glaring instance of this is to be found in the chapter on Kant in Earl Russell's *History of Western Philosophy*, from which I extract the following gem. "Kant gives as an illustration of the categorical imperative that it is wrong to borrow money, because, if we all tried to do so, there would be no money left to borrow." Kant was not a fool; he never taught or thought that it is wrong to borrow money; and nothing remotely resembling this nonsense is to be found in his writings. What he did discuss is the case of a man who borrows money and is tempted to evade repaying it because it would be inconvenient for him to do so. So long as it is possible for an eminent philosopher to misrepresent Kant's ethical doctrines to this extent and to "get away with it," translations and analyses such as this of Professor Paton's will not be superfluous.

C. D. BROAD.

Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion. By REIDAR THOMTE. (Princeton University Press; London, Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1948. Pp. viii, 228. 18s. net.)

"It is the purpose of this book to furnish an introduction to the religious thought of Kierkegaard, and to stimulate interest in the study of his works." Mr. Thomte takes the reader through the three "stages" described by Kierkegaard; and he shows clearly the latter's pre-occupation with the question how one becomes a Christian or what it means to be a Christian. He is perfectly right in saying that Kierkegaard's "existentialism is religious through and through." Adopting this point of view he is able to expose Kierkegaard's thought in the proper light, in the light, that is to say, in which Kierkegaard himself saw it.

My chief criticism of the book is that there is too much Kierkegaard and too little Thomte. Kierkegaard wrote much that was beautiful, especially in his purely religious works, and the author rightly quotes therefrom; but Kierkegaard sometimes rivals Hegel for obscurity, and I question the wisdom of copious quotations, especially in an introductory work designed to send the reader to the original. Mr. Thomte's elucidations of Kierkegaard's ideas